Monetary policy and the stock market in South Africa: how do South African equity prices respond to expected and unexpected changes in the repo rate? by Ramatlo, Tshegofatso
1 
 
 
MONETARY POLICY AND THE STOCK MARKET IN SOUTH AFRICA 
How do South African equity prices respond to expected and unexpected changes in the repo rate? 
Tshegofatso Ramatlo 
Supervised by Godfrey Ndlovu 
In partial fulfilment of the Master of Commerce (MCom) in Economic Development 
February 11, 2019 
 
Abstract 
This analyses the impact of unexpected changes in monetary policy on the South African equity 
market over the period 2005 -2018. In an attempt to understand this relationship, two main 
views have emerged. The wealth effect suggests that monetary policy changes have an indirect 
effect on the stock market, via changes in the value of private portfolios. On the other hand, it 
has been argued that the stock market is an independent source of macroeconomic volatility to 
which policy makers may wish to consider. This paper applies an event study approach to 
examine the stock market reaction to monetary policy. Furthermore, to understand the economic 
sources underpinning that reaction a Vector autoregressive model is estimated. The results 
suggest that on average, a surprise rate hike of 100 basis points causes short term JSE All Share 
index total returns to decline by 2.71%. We also find that the stock market reacts positively 
(negatively) to expansionary (contractionary) unexpected monetary policy actions due to revised 
market expectations about future dividends, excess premiums and the discount rate. The findings 
are crucial for central bank policy makers and JSE stock market investors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The primary objective of monetary policy in South Africa is to achieve and maintain price stability, 
and thus enable balanced and sustainable economic growth and development. These objectives 
are often measured in terms of macroeconomic outcomes like employment, growth and inflation 
levels. However, the manner in which monetary policy affects these variables is to some extent 
indirect. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy is known to have long, variable and 
uncertain time lags (SARB, 2019). As a result, the most direct effect of monetary policy action can 
be observed on the stock market, through its impact on cash flows, discount rates, stock prices 
and returns of listed companies (Iddrisu et al, 2017). 
South Africa’s stock market has a significant contribution not only to growth and development of 
the financial sector., but to the economy at large. The ratio of total market value to gross domestic 
product (GDP) was 332% in 2018; second highest in the world (Bloomberg, 2018). A high level 
of market value to GDP would suggest that variation in the total value of the stock market has 
significant implications for spending and consumption which affect domestic output (Hassan, 
2013). Therefore, it is important to examine the link between monetary policy and the stock market 
in order to understand the transmission mechanism of monetary policy since changes in stock 
prices (which are linked to the real economy) play a crucial part as a transmission channel.  
Theory suggests that the stock market continuously reflects available information about monetary 
policy and the macroeconomic environment. Although the market may not always have perfect 
information or foresight, it is generally forward looking with sufficient malleability to incorporate 
any new information. Consequently, a large volume of theoretical and empirical literature has 
focused on investigating the extent to which financial markets react to unexpected monetary policy 
actions.  
Two divergent views have emerged on the transmission mechanism, the conventional view posits 
that, transmission through the stock market occurs via changes in the value of private portfolios, 
a concept known as the wealth effect, and changes in the cost of capital through the bank lending 
and balance sheet effects (Mishkin, 2001; Ioannidis and Konotonikas, 2006). 
Another view is that the stock market is an independent source of macroeconomic volatility to 
which monetary policy committees may wish to consider and respond to (Ioannidis and 
Konotonikas, 2006). The degree of variation inherent in stock market prices is high and will often 
experience pronounced expansionary (boom) or contractionary (bust) cycles. The real concerns lie 
in the periods where the stock market has materially deviated from its intrinsic value, wherein once 
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corrected, may result in undesirable consequences for the broader economy. For these reasons, it 
may prove useful to obtain quantitative estimates of the relationship between monetary policy and 
the stock market (Ioannidis and Konotonikas, 2006).  
The discounted cash flow (DCF) model posits that the value of a stock is equal to the present 
value of future expected cash flows. This implies that any monetary policy action will have an 
impact on (a) the future expected cash flows or (b) the discount rate. These two channels are inter-
connected since higher interest rates imply a higher discount rate and lower future cash flows. 
Consequently, contractionary monetary policy should be synonymous with lower stock prices in 
light of the higher discount rate for the future expected cash flows and muted economic activity. 
The reverse can be assumed for an expansionary policy environment which often facilitates higher 
economic activity and earnings for listed companies. Investors in the stock market analyse 
company strategies in the context of the prevailing monetary policy environment which can be 
inferred from changes in interest rates. Moreover, financial media reports are often found 
attributing stock price movements to the interest rate environment (Ioannidis and Konotonikas, 
2006; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005).  
Past studies examining the relation between stock market and unexpected monetary policy 
interventions, have focused mainly on the US economy (for example Bernanke et al, 2004; Bordo 
& Wheelock, 2004; Rigbon & Sack, 2002 among others), with a few in other developed markets 
(for example Zeng, 2010; Heinlein and Lepori, 2018; Balfas et al 2018) and the Chinese market 
(for example Tang et al, 2013; Chen and Xie, 2016).  From these studies, two broad categories of 
studies have emerged. The first body of studies employ single and or multivariate equations and 
only seek to establish whether there is a relationship between monetary policy and the stock 
market, without giving much attention on the economic dynamics that underpin that relationship. 
Most of these are single country studies, and they show that the stock market responds negatively 
to an unexpected rate increase (Rigobon and Sack (2002), Zeng (2010) and Tang et al, 2013). 
Particularly, Tang et al (2013) note that this negative reaction is more pronounced (with larger 
fluctuations) in a bear market for Chinese stocks. Zeng (2010) used an event study to also 
determine the speed of the stock market returns’ reaction and found that the stock market in 
Australia stops reacting to monetary news after 90 – 120 minutes.  
 
The second group of studies go a step further and investigate the economic dynamics that 
influence the relationship. Two inferences can be drawn from the second category of studies. The 
first is that, while there exists a relationship between unexpected monetary policy and stock prices, 
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the response of the stock market is only attributable to changes in expectations about future cash 
flows and excess returns (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Fausch and Sigonius, 2017; Ioannidis and 
Konotonikas, 2006) 1  The second inference, which is highly contested, is that the reaction of the 
stock market is also attributable to changes in the discount rate used in the discounted cash flow 
model (Thornton, 1987: 3; Li and Hu, 1998). On the other hand, some studies suggest that the 
equity market reacts positively (negatively) to expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy 
surprises only during tough economic times , that is market cycles synonymous with negative 
economic growth (recession) or deteriorating financial conditions (Basitha and Kurov, 2008; 
Kurov, 2010; Bordo & Wheelock, 2004).  
Empirical studies from African countries is limited and are not focused a single country (for 
example Coleman and Agyire-Tettey, 2008; Sunday, 2013; Mabitle (2013); Iddrisu et al 2017) and 
inadvertently  imply an identical reaction across African countries. Specifically Iddrisu et al (2017)2 
employ a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model, with various monetary and macroeconomic 
variables, to examine the relationship between monetary policy and the stock market. They found 
that the stock market  reacted positively to monetary interventions particularly through the interest 
rate (discount rate) channel, in all 12 African countries in their study. Although, Naraidoo and 
Raputsoane (2013) employ a single country study, they however focus on the response of financial 
markets and monetary policy to uncertainty in South Africa, and do not provide much insight on 
the relationship between monetary policy and stock market. 
This paper contributes to the growing corpus of international knowledge by extending this 
investigation to the stock market in South Africa and fills the scant in African literature. It differs 
from Iddrisu et al (2017) in that it focuses on a single country, thereby averting the challenge of 
different regulatory and monetary policy frameworks. In addition, Iddrisu et al (2017) and Mabitle 
(2013) do not distinguish between the expected and unexpected element of policy surprises. This 
paper uses a unique measure for repo rate surprise like Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Furthermore, 
the use of a VAR technique helps to examine the bidirectional relationship between the stock 
market and monetary policy as with Mabitle (2013) however differs in a sense that the VAR is 
employed to explain the underlying factors driving the reaction of the stock market. The African 
studies above do not address this at a single country level, hence the need to fill this gap. It 
                                                          
1 Ioannadis & Kontonikas 2006 focus on 13 OECD countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Sweden. Spain and Finland  
2 The countries include: Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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empirically examines the relationship between expected and unexpected monetary policy actions 
with the equity market.  
The objectives of the paper seeks to contribute to existing literature in a number of ways. First, 
the paper analyses responses at an aggregate level and industry specific level, and examine 
industries in South Africa which are particularly sensitive to unanticipated monetary policy actions, 
which is also a unique addition of this paper relative to other African studies. This is important for 
investors who make investment decisions based on a balance of risks attached to a particular 
industry. Secondly, the sample period chosen (2005-2018) captures key macroeconomic events like 
the global financial crisis, local political unrest3 and a recession, to name a few. These are key 
deteriorating factors which the monetary policy committee considers when making policy 
decisions. Moreover, the period captures a time when South Africa has firmly implemented 
Inflation Targeting as a monetary framework, ruling out any regulatory ambiguity that may arise 
when analysing different monetary frameworks. Further, with a stock market of R14bn as at 
January 2019 (Bloomberg, 2019),  more than twice the value of GDP, the link between monetary 
policy and the stock market is important from a South African more so considering the fact that 
it is one of the leading stock markets in Africa. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and discusses 
the theory of monetary policy transmission and its impact on the stock market. Section 3 gives a 
brief overview of monetary policy in South Africa. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 5 presents the results of the empirical study and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Monetary policy and the stock market: theory and empirical evidence 
 
Whilst the “ultimate objective” of monetary policy is expressed in terms of macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation, the influence of policy instruments may also have an indirect impact on 
the economy, through the stock market. Changes in stock prices affect the real economy by 
affecting firms’ cost of capital and their capacity to raise new capital and invest, as well as through 
the wealth effect of stock prices on consumption and economic growth (Basistha & Kurov, 2008). 
From a discounted cash flow (DCF) perspective, stock prices (Pt ) are estimated as the present 
value of expected future cash flows from that asset, i.e. dividends (Dt+j), such that:    
                                                          
3 Marikana Massacre (2012) and Nenegate (2016) 
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Where: Et is the conditional expectations operator based on information available to market 
participants at time t, R is the discount rate (assumed to be constant) and t is the investor’s time 
horizon, and K is the holding period. 
Under the standard transversality condition5 as the investor’s holding period, K, increases, the 
second term of equation (1) tends to zero as there are no rational stock price bubble therefore: 
            lim
𝐾→∞
𝐸𝑡 [(
1
1+𝑅
)
𝐾 
𝑃𝑡+𝐾] = 0                                       (2) 
Leading to the familiar equity valuation model: 
        𝑃𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 [∑ (
1
1+𝑅
)
𝑗
 𝐷𝑡+𝑗
𝐾
𝑗=1 ]                                                              (3) 
Viewed in this way, monetary policy affects equity returns in two ways: either by altering the 
discount rate used by economic agents, or by influencing expectations of future economic 
activities, which consequently affect future cash flows (Ioannidis and Kontonikas, 2008).  
A more restrictive monetary policy implies higher discount rates and lower future cash flows; 
therefore, increasing the repo rate should be associated with lower stock prices and vice versa 
(Thorbecke, 1997; Ioannidis & Kontonikas, 2008). Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) provide three 
broad reasons why an unexpected increase in the repo rate may lead to a decline in stock prices: 
1. The policy shock may result in an increase in the future expected real interest rate used to 
discount dividends.   
2. The policy shock may be associated with a decrease in expected future dividends. 
3. The policy shock may increase the expected excess returns (equity premiums) associated 
with holding stocks.  
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find through log linear approximation testing that the second and 
third explanations are the most relevant – somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the real interest rate 
is insignificant compared to the other factors, perhaps because of its relative stability or because it 
does not affect the cost of equity directly. This supports earlier findings by Jensen and Johnson 
(1995), who suggest that stock performance patterns (and therefore price) cannot be explained by 
                                                          
4 See Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2008) for detailed explanation on the derivation  
5Transversality conditions are optimality conditions often used along Euler equations to characterise the optimal 
paths of dynamic economic models (Kamihigashi, 2006) 
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interest rate movements. This is in contrast to Li and Hu (1998) who postulate that a more 
restrictive monetary policy emanating from a surprise increase in money supply leads to a decline 
in stock prices. This, they argue, is due to the policy anticipation effect (also known as the liquidity 
effect) which asserts that when the SARB unexpectedly increase money supply, they are in effect 
signalling a tighter monetary policy trajectory in the future as a way to offset the increase in money 
supply. Market participants thus expect higher interest rates and discount rates in the future.  
In theory, an increase in the repo rate will result in an immediate increase in market interest rates 
which leads to a decrease in stock prices of firms listed on the exchange market (Kuttner, 2001). 
As Thornton (1986: 3) explains, the relationship between the repo rate and market interest rates is 
governed by the loanable funds theory which states that interest rates are “determined by the 
intersection of the demand for and supply of credit”(Thornton, 1986:3). Therefore, changes in the 
repo rate will affect market interest rates only to the extent that they alter the demand for and 
supply of credit by listed firms. However, some evidence from past studies does not support this 
theoretical postulation. As an example, Cook and Hahn (1989) as well as Roley and Sellon (1995) 
argue that the Federal funds rate6 has little impact on market interest rates (see also Radecki and 
Reinhart, 1994; Edelberg and Marshall, 1996). This would suggest that monetary policy changes 
have no impact on market interest rates as suggested theoretically by Thornton (1986:3) and 
therefore cannot influence discount rates.   
The study by Igelias (2011) support the theoretical assertions of Thornton (1986: 3) and also argues 
that the key avenue through which monetary policy may transfer to equity prices is through interest 
rates. Interest rates have a direct effect on the demand for loans. Higher interest rates imply a 
higher cost of borrowing which may dis-incentivise firms from borrowing to invest. If firms invest 
less, the present value of their future cash flows may decline which will cause a negative impact on 
equity prices and returns. On the other hand, Maio (2013) applied a vector autoregressive model 
on data from the US, over the period 1963 to 2008 and established rather, that the negative effect 
of federal funds rate shocks on stock returns is attributable to the corresponding negative effect 
on future expected cash flows, more than it is to changes in the discount rate.  
Still on the interest debate, literature from African economies is scant. That said, Mabitle (2013) 
finds that there exists no long run relationship between the stock market and monetary policy 
South Africa, only a contemporaneous and dynamic short run relationship. This, they argue, 
emanates from innovations in the equity market which affects monetary policy decisions and vice 
                                                          
6 In the United States, the federal funds rate is the rate at which banks and credit unions actively trade balances held 
at the Federal Reserve with each other on an uncollateralized basis (Bloomberg, 2015).  
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versa. Iddrisu et al (2017) employ a cross country approach and study how 12 African countries 
respond to monetary and macroeconomic news. Their findings show that stock markets in all 12 
countries reacted positively to expansive monetary interventions. They emphasise that the 
influence on stock prices in all 12 countries occurred via the interest rate channel.  
The debate surrounding which channel of influence monetary policy affects the most is a recurring 
theme found in this scope of literature. However, studies which conclude that there is no apparent 
link that exists do not distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy 
interventions. Distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated policy actions is therefore 
essential for discerning the effect of policy interventions on market interest rates. Estimating the 
response of equity prices to changes in monetary policy is complicated by the fact that the market 
is unlikely to respond to anticipated policy interventions. This implies that some effort needs to 
be applied to isolate the unanticipated policy action which can be reasonably expected to induce a 
market response. This also means that the market response is not limited to central bank surprise 
actions and will also respond to any changes in expectations regarding future policy. The 
unexpected policy action acts a proxy for convenient exogenous events which allows researchers 
to clearly ascertain the stock market’s reaction to monetary intervention (Bernanke and Kuttner, 
2005).  
Kuttner (2001) was among the first to investigate the impact of expected and unexpected 
components of monetary policy on market interest rates. Using Federal funds futures data, over 
the period 1989 to 2000, the study found a strong relationship between surprise policy actions and 
market interest rates, whereas the response to anticipated interventions was small, if not non-
existent. In a widely cited contribution, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) adapt the work of Kuttner 
(2001) and investigate the observed market response to policy surprises, across both broad stock 
indices and industry portfolios.  Using log-linear approximation, they decompose excess equity 
returns into components that can be attributed to news about changes in the real interest rate, 
dividends and future excess returns in the United States. They employ the Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) methodology to attain proxies for the relevant expectations about the path that monetary 
policy will take. Their results show that the largest effects came from revisions to expectations of 
future excess returns and to expectations for future dividends. However, real interest rate, although 
significant in the model, had a negligible impact.  
Thorbeke (1997) also studied how the federal monetary policy shocks affect equity prices in the 
United States using multiple methodologies. The author also employed the VAR methodology 
with impulse response and variance decomposition to analyse the causality between the federal 
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funds rate, monthly equity returns and growth in output. He finds that expansionary monetary 
policy (lowering interest rates) leads to a positive reaction from the stock market. Further, he 
established that monetary policy surprises, measured by orthogonalized innovations in the federal 
funds rate have a bigger impact on smaller capitalisation stocks. This affirms the hypothesis that 
monetary policy has an effect on the ability of firms to access credit.  
The credit and interest rate channels of the monetary policy channel imply that listed firms that 
are highly encumbered financially are likely to be the hardest hit in a tighter monetary environment. 
This is because these firms are likely to be characterised by constrained financial ratios (example, 
low interest cover capacity, bad credit ratings, and low cash holdings) which will likely deteriorate 
further if monetary policy officials unexpectedly raise interest rates. While Balafas et al (2018) 
acknowledge the role of the aforementioned, they found no significant evidence proving that more 
financially constrained firms on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) were more responsive to 
monetary policy shocks in comparison to those firms who were relatively less encumbered and 
constrained.  
They attribute this finding to the possibility that investors on the LSE do not consider the 
relationship between financial constraints and monetary policy interventions as a risk when making 
short run investment decisions. Moreover, the majority of the firms that were more encumbered 
were smaller cap firms, which have limited trading liquidity suggesting that their prices are slower 
to incorporate interest rate shocks. Furthermore, while theory suggests an inverse relationship 
between tighter monetary policy and stock prices, they found that the relationship became positive 
during the global financial crisis and when the interest rate environment was more restrictive. This 
corroborates findings by Fausch and Sigonius (2017).  
However, in contrast to Igelias (2011) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Thorbeke’s results show 
that monetary policy shocks only account for a small proportion of equity price changes because 
equity prices respond with significant delay. Furthermore, Mann, Atra and Dowwen (2004) 
analysed the short term sensitivity of six international stock indices namely the S&P 500, Morgan 
Stanley Capital international (MSCI) European stock index, MSCI pacific stock index and three 
MSCI country stock (UK, Japan and Germany) indices to changes in the US discount rate and the 
federal funds rate from 1970 to 2001. Their findings echo Thorbeke (1997) and emphasise that 
not all monetary policy changes in all monetary operating periods induce changes in equity prices. 
This highlights the importance of acknowledging the diversity of economic environments 
suggesting that the magnitudes of the effect of shocks to monetary policy may be substantially 
different across economies (Iglesias, 2011).  
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Further to this, there is evidence that other dynamics may influence the extent to which the stock 
market reacts to unanticipated policy interventions, even in ways that contradict theoretical 
underpinnings. For example Marinescu et al (2017) suggest domestic equity market reactions in 
the US are determined by whether policy decisions at the time were rule based or discretionary. 
Rule based decisions emulated the Taylor formula from Taylor (1993)7, which is a numerical 
equation and rule of thumb that connects the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 
target of the federal funds rate with the economy. Their results show that policy decisions that 
followed the Taylor Rule led to rational reactions by the S&P 500. On the other hand, discretionary 
decisions, which emerged in the year 2000 and is characterised by deviations from the Taylor rule, 
led to microeconomic inefficiencies, persistent inflation and was correlated with high investments 
in housing which ultimately enabled the 2008 global financial crisis.  
However recent studies seem to strengthen the findings by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). For 
example, Fausch and Sigonius (2017) find that the overall movement of excess returns from the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) German stock index is associated with revised 
expectations from economic agents regarding future dividends. Fausch and Sigonius (2017), also 
suggest that the prevailing interest rate regime in Europe influenced how German stock behaved 
towards policy action. They found that during periods of negative interest rates, unanticipated 
monetary tightening led to a decline in excess returns of the MSCI Germany. Kurov and Stan 
(2017) highlight an intertemporal rational expectations equilibrium model which shows that 
prevailing policy uncertainty within the market causes equity investors to overemphasise the 
severity of bad news during periods when they believe the economy is in a good condition. In 
contrast, during periods when economic agents believe that the economy is facing unfavourable 
circumstances, they tend to underemphasise the value of good news. This investor sentiment 
regarding uncertainty impacts the discount rate used to value stock prices. Their thesis asserts that 
the higher the presence of monetary policy uncertainty in the investment community, the higher 
the discount rate, and the more likely it becomes for stock prices to decline.  
Broadly speaking, most researchers in this field of study utilise an event study methodology on 
daily data to their studies (see for example Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Zeng, 2010; Haitsma et 
al, 2015). There are two possible issues that arise from employing this method as highlighted by 
Zeng (2010). The first pertains to endogeneity, which is that monetary policy officials maybe 
making surprise policy interventions in response to stock market movements. The second 
pertains to the possibility of a joint response to news by both monetary officials and the stock 
                                                          
7 See Bernanke (2015) for a more detailed explanation of the Taylor Formula.  
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market. Moreover, using an event study does not allow researchers to observe and compare 
changes in the stock market on event and non-event days and relied on survey and consensus 
expectations (from Bloomberg and Reuters) to measure the surprise element of policy rate 
changes (Rigobon and Sack, 2003). However, the method has evolved over time and significant 
effort has been exerted to improve the method including the way the surprise element is 
measured (Gurkanynak, 2002; Zettlemeyer, 2004; Kearns and Manners; 2006). 
The endogeneity and joint response issue has somewhat been averted through the use of daily 
intraday data and shorter event study windows (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Furthermore, 
Rigobon and Sack (2002) employ a heteroskedasticity based estimator of the surprise policy 
action to circumvent the endogeneity problem and yield a more consistent estimates of the stock 
market’s reaction. As a result, an event study methodology is now still widely accepted in 
literature (Zeng, 2010). The VAR methodology is also widely employed by researchers (see for 
example Rigobon and Sack 2004; Mabitle, 2013; Fausch, 2018). The method is also susceptible to 
the issue of endogeneity, and not accounting for this in the model may result in biased empirical 
estimations (Rigobon and Sack, 2004). 
Literature shows that there are a myriad of considerations when analysing the relationship between 
monetary policy and the stock market. These pertain to the reigning economic climate of a specific 
country and global economic dynamics which affect the direction and size of the stock market 
response, sometimes even in a way that disproves theory. The results from the developed world 
are plenty and diverse, making the corpus of research a reliable framework for a South African 
study. The next section describes the data and methodology employed by this paper.   
3. Overview of how monetary policy has evolved in South Africa  
 
Emerging market economies are increasingly gaining prominence in both international trade and 
finance. Financial and foreign exchange markets in these countries are becoming more 
sophisticated and international interest in their assets is evidenced by rising levels of volatility and 
exposure to external shocks. South Africa is testament to the aforementioned and is host to the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), which is the largest stock exchange on the African continent, 
and the 19th largest out of 79 stock exchanges in the world (JSE, 2018). The rand is a free floating 
currency which is commonly traded and as such, is sensitive to economic and political shocks. The 
country provides a rich context for analysing the impact of events on asset prices. With its historical 
landscape of close to five decades of racial segregation and the transition into a multi-racial 
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democracy, the country still faces a plethora of economic problems. Since this transition, there has 
been a number of monetary and political developments.  
 
Table 1: Major Political Events 
in South Africa    
    
Event Date (Month) Event Name/Description  
December 2002 ANC elective conference in Stellenbosch  
April 2004 National elections 
December 2007 ANC elective conference in Polokwane  
September 2008 Recall of President Thabo Mbeki 
April 2009 National elections 
August 2012 Marikana Massacre 
October 2012 Anglo American Platinum 12000 striking workers 
December 2012 ANC elective conference Mangaung  
May 2014 National elections 
December 2015 Jacob Zuma axes Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene  
March 2017 Jacob Zuma axes Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan  
December 2017 
ANC Elective Conference Johannesburg - Cyril Ramaphosa 
becomes ANC President  
February 2018 
Jacob Zuma resigns as President, Cyril Ramaphosa becomes 
President of South Africa  
Source: Bloomberg, Mpofu and Peters 
(2017)   
 
Between 1960 and 1998, The South African Reserve Bank followed a wide range of monetary 
policy and complementary exchange rate frameworks. These varied from exchange rate targeting, 
discretionary monetary policy, monetary aggregate targeting and an eclectic approach (May et al, 
2017). In February 2000, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) adopted an inflation targeting 
(IT) monetary framework with the objective of achieving price stability in the interest of 
sustainable and balanced economic growth and development, in a credible and transparent 
manner. The SARB’s inflation target has been 3 – 6 percent, which is a relatively more flexible 
than a point target framework. The SARB seeks to ensure that inflation is within the target band 
and will achieve this by adjusting the repurchase rate (repo rate). Inflation targeting allows the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to decide on an opposite monetary policy stance which the 
Governor of the SARB will communicate to the public on predetermined announcement dates. A 
Monetary Policy Committee was constituted before the formal adoption of the IT Framework, in 
line with global standards such that rate decisions are made objectively by a diverse and qualified 
constituency. Subsequent to every MPC meeting, the SARB will issue a statement with reasons for 
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their monetary policy stance, generally pertaining to why the SARB has decided to increase, 
decrease or make no change to the repo rate. 
 
Table 2: Details of the SARB Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) Meetings  
    
Years  
Scheduled 
Meetings (per 
year) 
Unscheduled 
Meetings (per 
year) 
2004 - 2008 2 -3  0 
2009 9 0 
2010 - 2012  6 0 
2013 - 2018 6 0  
   
   
Source: Bloomberg, SARB, Mpofu and Peters (2017) 
 
Table 2 above shows that the SARB decided on a varying number of meetings per year and finally 
agreed to keep the frequency of meeting to 6 per year. The total number of unscheduled meetings 
was 4 in a period of 16 years, and each unscheduled meeting was prompted by unexpected political 
events and extreme rand depreciation which posed significant risk to inflation expectations. Since 
our period of study is between 2005 and 2018, there are no unscheduled meetings in our data and 
thus reduces the risk of ambiguity and distortion in the results.  
The SARB is responsible for managing overall liquidity in the market and building foreign 
denominated reserves and as such will participate in the foreign exchange market even though it 
does not explicitly target the exchange rate.  Announcements of changes in the Repo rate have 
direct implications on the market (prime lending) rate which is linked to the stock market and have 
an impact on the exchange rate. Therefore, it is likely that monetary policy actions will have some 
bearing on the short term behaviour of the equity and foreign exchange markets (Mpofu and 
Peters, 2017).  
The repo rate was established under the repurchase tender system of the SARB and was introduced 
in 1998, before the adoption of the IT Framework. The repo rate is the rate at which the central 
bank borrows money to commercial banks to meet daily liquidity shortages. Liquidity refers to 
credit balances that commercial banks have with the SARB that are available to settle interbank 
transactions in excess of the required statutory minimum reserves that they are required by law to 
hold. The SARB makes the repo rate effective and forces commercial banks to borrow large sums 
of money by draining excess liquidity and creating a shortage in liquidity through open market 
transactions using various instruments at their disposal like issuing its own debentures where 
market participants tender for the amounts and interest rates on SARB debentures, which are then 
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allocated in ascending order of the interest rates bid, until the amount on tender is fully subscribed 
(SARB, 2018). The bank will then refinance the liquidity shortage it created with repurchase 
agreement auctions where it purchases selected government bonds and other money market 
instruments from commercial banks in exchange for cash. The commercial banks pay the central 
bank borrowing rate for the cash they receive and at maturity return the cash to the bank in 
exchange for the instruments they previously sold to the bank at the auction which reverses the 
initial transaction. In the early stages, daily liquidity for this transaction was enabled by a variable 
repo rate which was determined in the market. In doing so, the market would signal what the 
underlying liquidity conditions were to the bank. Any changes to the repo rate signalled changes 
in market liquidity (May et al, 2017).  
Since 1970, monetary policy in South Africa has developed gradually from a non-market based 
system with stringent direct controls to a fully market integrated system. Since the adoption of 
inflation targeting, inflation levels have been managed in a way that promotes business and does 
not hamper investment (Mabitle, 2013).  
4. Data and Methodology 
An event study approach is employed to measure the response of stock market returns, as with 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). The surprise element of monetary policy action is defined using 
monthly data spanning the years October 2005 – October 2018. Historical repo rate data is found 
on the official SARB website. All other data is collected from Bloomberg. Monthly data allows 
one to measure the surprise element at regular time intervals and is better suited for the VAR 
methodology that is also utilised in this paper (section 5.3) to assess the causes of the equity 
market’s response. 
Due to data availability, certain adjustments have been made that allow for an extension of their 
approach to the case of South Africa. Specifically, their analysis makes use of federal funds futures 
data in order to construct a measure of unexpected policy interventions. However, futures on the 
Repurchase rate (commonly known as the repo rate), which serve as the South African equivalent 
to the federal funds rate, are not traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange or any other 
regulated platform.  
Despite this, 1 month futures on the Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate (JIBAR)8 do exist and 
serve as a very good proxy for repo futures. As seen in Figure 1 below, the repo rate and the JIBAR 
                                                          
8 JIBAR is a term that refers to the Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate.  This is the rate that banks use in interbank 
credit agreements. JIBAR is quoted independently through the futures market on a daily basis and is a true market-
15 
 
are closely aligned and any change in the repo is almost immediately adjusted for in the JIBAR. 
Ioannidis and Konotonikas (2006); Wang and Mayes (2012) also utilise futures as a proxy for the 
official policy rate. 
The FTSE /JSE Africa All Share Index is used as a measure for stock market returns. The index 
is a free-float market-weighted index. Companies included in the index make up the top 99% of 
the market capitalization of all listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Bloomberg, 
2019). This paper uses the JSE All Share Total Return index which assumes all dividends have 
been reinvested and are accounted for. Financials, Industrials and Resources9 are equally weighted 
stocks of largest 25 companies listed in each industry respectively (JSE, 2019; Bloomberg, 2019).  
This paper adopts the method of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) to examine the impact of 
monetary policy interventions (both expected and unexpected) on equity prices. A number of 
researchers adopt a similar approach (for example Wiranto, 2008; Fausch, 2018). Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) use both monthly and daily data in their study, however this paper only employs 
monthly data. The unanticipated change in monetary (∆𝑖𝑢) in any given month can be 
formulated as below: 
where 𝑖𝑡,𝑚 is the repo rate on day m  of the month t, 𝑓𝑡−1,𝑀
1  represents the one month JIBAR futures 
contract rate on the last day (M) of the previous month (t – 1). Bloomberg calculates the settlement 
price of a JIBAR futures contract as the average over a calendar month, with weekends and public 
holidays carrying over the last business day’s rate. The above definition of the surprise element may 
cause the size of the policy surprise to be underestimated. This arises because equation 5 uses 
monthly data and may cause a time aggregation issue (See Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). 
Consequently, for equation 5 to hold for the analysis, this paper has had to make some assumptions10 
about the days in which rate changes occurred. As a result, some discretion is required when 
interpreting the size of the surprise element.   
                                                          
determined rate. The 1 month JIBAR is often seen as an approximation by the market of what the Repo rate should 
average over the next month (West, 2008).  
9 Bloomberg reference: JFINX Index for Financials, JRESO Index for Resources and JASIN for Industrials  
10 The assumptions are as follows: (a) there are 30 days in a month. (b) no other macroeconomic news occurred on 
the same day that policy rates were announced  
∆𝑖𝑢 =  
1
𝑀
∑ 𝑖𝑡,𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
− 𝑓𝑡−1,𝑀
1  
 
(5) 
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From the above, the expected component of the repo rate change can therefore be defined as the 
difference between the futures rate on the last day (M) of the previous month (t-1) and the repo rate 
on the last day (M) of the previous month (t-1). This can be formally expressed as follows: 
Since 2000, when the Reserve Bank announced that Monetary Policy in South Africa had adopted 
inflation targeting, changes in the Repo rate became increasingly transparent (Arora, 2007:11). The 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), which sets and reviews the Repo, began announcing its meeting 
timetable before the beginning of each year, allowing the public to be aware of the meeting dates 
well in advance (SARB, 2019). After 2000, an MPC statement was issued after every meeting through 
a press conference by the Governor of the Reserve Bank which was broadcast on national television 
(SARB, 2019). Due to the repo change being announced before the close of the futures market, it is 
likely that the closing futures price incorporates all the day’s news regarding monetary policy. 
Prior to 2000, however, changes in the Repo were not as easily observed by the general public, and 
were often only made available the day after the policy action. As our sample focuses on the period 
from 2005 to 2018, all timing ambiguity associated with rate changes is eliminated. The total number 
of observations in the sample is 154.  
More formally, the regression is expressed as:  
                                        ∆𝐽𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                                                                                     (7)    
Where ∆𝐽𝑡 represents the change in the 
 JSE All-Share total return at time t, and ∆𝑖𝑡 is the change in the repo rate. On the other hand, the 
regression results in column (b) of Table 6 explicitly account for the expected and unexpected 
components of repo changes. This can be formally expressed as: 
                                       ∆𝐽𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽
𝑒∆𝑖𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑢∆𝑖𝑡
𝑢 +  𝜀𝑡                                                                (8)   
Where ∆𝑖𝑡
𝑒and ∆𝑖𝑡
𝑢 are the expected and unexpected components respectively, as expressed in 
Equations 5 and 6 above. In Equations 7 and 8, 𝜀𝑡 is an error term accounting for other factors 
that affect equity returns other than Monetary Policy on days where interventions took place. As 
can be seen in Column (a) of Table 6, the response of the stock market to raw Repo changes 
confirms theory and shows a negative relationship between monetary policy and equity returns. 
However, the response is small and insignificant. 
∆𝑖𝑒 = 𝑓𝑡−1,𝑀
1 − 𝑖𝑡−1,𝑀 
 
(6) 
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Figure 1: One month JIBAR compared to the SARB repo rate.  
The figure below shows the movement of the one month JIBAR relative to the SARB repo rate over the 
period 2005 – 2018.  
 
Source: Bloomberg, SARB 
From a South African perspective, the link between monetary policy and financial markets has not 
been as extensively documented11. Data availability is frequently cited as a limitation, and often 
warrants a sceptical interpretation of results. This is not the first paper to use the JIBAR as a proxy 
for the repo rate, for example Ballim and Moolman (2005), use 3 month JIBAR daily futures data 
to investigate whether market traders accurately predict interest rate changes by the SARB before 
each Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting. However, to evaluate expectations, shorter 
duration futures contracts are arguably more appropriate. If the MPC meetings are approximately 
6-weekly (SARB, 2019), the 3 month futures contract effectively incorporates expectations of two 
meetings, and thereby does not accurately depict the market’s expectation of a given policy 
intervention.  
To this end, by using shorter duration futures contract, this paper seeks to more evidently isolate 
the unexpected component of policy interventions. As Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) state, to 
measure the causal effect of monetary policy, it becomes necessary to control for the variation in 
economic fundamentals that the policy rate endogenously responds to. Further to this, using 
central bank announcements potentially eliminates the problem of endogeneity and more closely 
                                                          
11 The few studies available include Gupta and Reid (2012) who investigate the sensitivity of stock market returns to 
monetary and macroeconomic shocks. Other South African studies like Mpofu and Peters (2017) and Roussow et al 
(2017) focus on the foreign exchange market and how it responds to unanticipated monetary policy interventions. 
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captures the impact of monetary policy on real activity and prices (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; 
Nakumura and Steinsson, 2013). Moreover, providing an economic explanation (established using 
a VAR technique) for the observed response of the market improves on existing South African 
literature which has largely documented the response (or lack thereof), but provides a limited 
explanation for why the market moves.12 
 
Descriptive Data  
Table 3 below displays a summary of statistics for a sample of Index Returns for the JSE All 
Share, Financials, Resources and Industrials. It also includes a summary of the repo rate and the 
1 month JIBAR, which is the proxy for the repo rate employed in this paper.  
Table 3: Descriptive Data  
   Mean  Median  Max Min  SD* JB**  Pr  Obs 
JIBAR  0.07 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.02 46.69 0.00 154 
FINANCIALS  10.08 10.07 10.75 0.01 0.89 70456.23 0.00 154 
INDUSTRIALS  2.30 2.31 2.38 -0.003 0.19 126540.9 0.00 154 
ALL SHARE  10.32 10.37 10.94 0.03 0.92 66232.97 0.00 154 
RESOURCES  9.33 10.13 10.60 0.00 2.72 638.74 0.00 154 
REPO RATE  0.07 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.02 43.86 0.00 154 
UNEXPECTED 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00020 -0.00040 0.00007 182.09 0.00 154 
EXPECTED 0.00030 0.00030 0.00070 -0.00900 0.00156 469.62 0.00 154 
Note: Monthly Equity Returns are measured in Rand Terms. All returns are the first difference of the natural log of the Index. 
*denotes Standard Deviation ** denotes Jarque Bera Test for Normality  
 
The mean monthly equity returns at a disaggregated level are higher for the financial and 
resource indexes. Average returns in the industrials sector are well below other sectors and the 
All Share index in general. The outperformance of the resource sector relative to Industrials can 
be attributed to the commodity price super cycle which persisted from mid-2000 and peaked in 
2008. Commodity prices (energy, metals and agriculture) rose tremendously over the period. For 
                                                          
12 Investigating why the South African market moves when it does not anticipate a change in the Repo is frequently 
cited as an area demanding further research (see for example Arora 2007; Aron and Muellbauer 2007).  
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example Brent crude oil reached highs of $133 per barrel (up 94% from the year before) and 
nominal prices for energy and metals surged 230% (Baffes and Haniotes, 2010). The industrials 
underperformed the market on average over the period mainly because of the sector’s cyclicality 
and investor sentiment weighing it down (Nelissen, 2018; Dash and Mahakud; 2013). Results 
from the Jaque-Bera test indicate the Index Returns are non-normal, an unsurprising 
characteristic of equity returns.   
Short term interest rate variables and spreads have long been key areas of interest for researchers 
and policy makers (Li and Hu, 1998). Any change in the short term interest rate is a signal for the 
path that monetary policy officials are embarking on. The average short term interest rate (JIBAR 
futures) in South Africa during the period was 7%. The variation of interest rates was substantially 
lower than it was for equity prices, highlighting the volatile and risky nature of stock returns (the 
standard deviations of 0.02 and 0.92 respectively). The Jarque-Bera test for interest rates also 
highlights non-normality.  
Table 3 also highlights that Resource and Financial stocks are more volatile than Industrials stocks. 
Volatility describes the price variance of a stock from its lowest to its highest point over time 
(Hecht, 2018). The standard deviation for Resources is 2.72, which is higher than the market 
standard deviation of 0.92. Financials have a standard deviation of 0.89, which is relatively aligned 
to the JSE All Share Index. The JIBAR and Repo rate have very little price variance (the standard 
deviations of 0.04 and 0.05 respectively) when compared to the equity market highlighting the 
higher risk attached to equity investments (Ioannidis and Kontonikas, 2006).  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (David Dickey and Wayne Fuller, 1979) and the Phillip Perron 
test are common tests researchers employ when conducting stationarity testing (Wooldridge, 
2013). The null hypothesis postulates that a series contains a unit root. Unit root testing is a critical 
step in any time series empirical analysis because it enables the researcher to establish if shocks to 
the series have had transitionary or permanent effects (Nielsen, 2005). In addition, regressing two 
series that are non-stationary and contain unit roots increases the likelihood of obtaining a spurious 
regression (Washington, 2014).  
The Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are advantageous over the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
because they correct for serial correlation and are robust against heteroscedasticity. In addition, 
performing PP tests over ADF means it is not a requirement to specify lag length (Qiu, 2019). 
However for robustness, both tests were performed on all variables. The first round of the test 
includes trend and intercept in level form which showed that all variables besides the “expected” 
and “unexpected” contained unit roots and were non-stationary. The second round of test was 
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performed on the JALSH, Financials, Industrials and Resources in first difference (including the 
intercept). The Table 4 below shows PP and ADF results for the series. The results show that after 
the variables have been first differenced, one can reject the null hypothesis at 95% confidence 
level, and conclude that the series is stationary.  
Table 4: Unit Root Test  
  Phillips Perron Augmented Dickey Fuller   
Variables  Coefficient  
Test 
Statistic  
Standard 
Error  
P 
Value  
Integrated  Coefficient  
Test 
Statistic  
Standard 
Error  
P 
Value  
JALSH (1.08) (13.10) 0.08 0.00 I(2) (1.07) (13.01) 0.08 0.00 
Expected  (1.49) (20.69) 0.07 0.00 I(0) (1.38) (13.20) 0.11 0.00 
Unexpected  (1.65) (26.41) 0.06 0.00 I(0) (0.76) (6.03) 0.13 0.00 
Financials  (1.01) (12.21) 0.08 0.00 I(1) (1.00) (12.24) 0.08 0.00 
Industrials  (1.00) (12.18) 0.08 0.00 I(1) (1.00) (12.21) 0.08 0.00 
Resources  (1.01) (12.33) 0.08 0.00 I(1) (0.09) (3.72) 0.02 0.00 
 
In addition, the variables JALSH, Financials, Industrials and Resources were log transformed to 
improve skewness and ideally ensure that the relationship between monetary policy and the stock 
market is linear.  
Table 5: Monetary Policy and Returns    
   
 
SARB Monetary 
Policy 2005 - 2018 
   
Number of Expansionary periods 10 
Total number of Expansionary months 115 
Average All Share Return during expansionary periods -0.01 
Number of Restrictive periods 15 
Total number of Restrictive months 138 
Average All Share Return during restrictive periods -0.04 
Note: An expansive (restrictive) policy stance is defined as the most recent decrease (increase) of the 
repo rate. 
Table 5 shows that during the sample period, the MPC adopted more restrictive interventions than 
expansionary ones13. The MPC considers international developments (oil price, exchange rate and 
growth prospects) as well as domestic factors (current and forecasted levels inflation and growth 
                                                          
13 Table 9 in the Appendix shows a detailed list of all the dates that the monetary policy committee made changes to 
the policy rate 
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expectations) when deciding which stance to take on monetary policy. The average return from 
the All Share Index was -0.01% during expansionary periods and -0.04% during restrictive periods. 
While average returns are generally flat, this shows that equity price returns were marginally lower 
during restrictive periods relative to expansionary periods.  
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline Specification Results  
Table 6 below reports the baseline estimates of equity returns’ response to monetary policy 
interventions. The results displayed in column (a) are based on a time series regression of the JSE 
All-Share return on repo rate changes, where the expected and unexpected components of the 
intervention are not accounted for. 
When the Repo rate changes are decomposed into their expected and unexpected components, 
the stock market reaction is seen to change. Specifically, the market’s reaction to the unexpected 
intervention is negative and highly significant (t stat >2). The results imply that a 1% surprise rate 
increase is estimated to reduce stock market returns by 2.7%. The direction of the results is 
consistent with earlier findings by Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2006); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); 
and reinforce Keynesian Transmission Mechanism. This mechanism asserts that restrictive 
Table 6: Dependent Variable: All-Share Return (∆𝐽𝑡) 
The table reports the results from regressions on the All-Share returns on changes in the Repo rate. Column (a) 
reports results where no distinction is made between expected and unexpected policy interventions whereas 
column (equation 7) (b) reports results where this distinction is explicitly controlled for (equation 8).  Estimates of 
coefficients and t-ratios are robust to residual heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.  
 
  
Dependent Variable: All-Share Return (∆Jt) 
  
  
  Coefficient    
  (a) (b)                         
Intercept 9.63 -0.445 
    (1.416 ) 
Repo Change -0.371 - 
  (7.62)   
Expected Change - 1.212* 
    
(0.473) 
 
Unexpected Change -  -2.710* 
    
(2.15063) 
 
R² 0.03 0.04 
 
(a) and (b): Equity Market: Number of observations: 154 (monthly data), period: October 2005 – October 2018. Driscoll and 
Kraay standard errors reported in parenthesis 
*Significant at the 10% level 
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(expansive) monetary policy changes decreases (increases) expected returns in the stock market. 
The reported R² for column (b) implies that 4% of the volatility in stock market prices in the 
month where rates were unexpectedly adjusted could be attributable to monetary policy 
interventions. Reserve Bank policy action therefore accounts for a negligible portion of the 
volatility in stock market reinforcing the rationale that stock market alpha is by and large 
determined by firm specific factors. 
Figure 2: Unanticipated Repo Rate and All Share Index Returns using monthly data 
The figure below is a scatterplot of the monthly JSE All Share Index Returns compared to changes in the repo rate 
for the sample of 154 months.  
 
The scatterplot exhibits the slight negative relationship between the JSE All Share Index returns 
and surprise repo rate changes. Figure 2 also highlights one notable outlier. This data point is 
found in May 2009, which was during national elections when Jacob Zuma was elected as President 
of South Africa. The SARB made no changes to the repo rate (see table 9 in the appendix) and the 
JSE All Share was up 6.5% during the month (Bloomberg, 2019). Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
found that excluding outliers did not significantly modify their results. The outlier does not change 
our results and is thus included in this paper’s analysis.  
5.2. Extended Specification: Industry Analysis Results 
So far the paper has focussed on the responses of broad market-level indexes; however, it will 
now examine the responses at a more disaggregated level. As such, we will now isolate the equity 
price responses of all major industry-level indexes. This is an interesting exercise given that each 
of these portfolios has a different underlying risk profile (assigning each profile with a unique 
market beta in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
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Table 7 above reports the estimates of each industry’s response to the expected and unexpected 
changes in the repo rate. Akin to Bernanke’s findings, consumer services and basic materials 
industries were the least responsive to the policy changes. Interestingly, the technology industry 
does not react as strongly as would usually be anticipated (coefficient is both small and 
insignificant). The South African telecommunications industry appears to have the largest adverse 
response to the unanticipated policy changes with a 1% surprise rate cut estimated to reduce 
technology stock returns by approximately 4%, a finding largely consistent with that of Bernanke 
and Kuttner (2005). The industrial and consumer goods industry portfolios are also seen to react 
strongly to unanticipated changes in the Repo, with a 1% surprise rate cut estimated to reduce 
industry returns by 3.33% and 2.2% respectively.  
Table 7 
Dependent Variable: 1 Day All-Share Return (∆𝐽𝑡)  
This table shows the results from time series regressions of 1 month industry portfolio returns 
(described in the row headings) on the expected and unexpected components of the 1 month 
average change in the Repo rate. All values are expressed in percentage form, The full sample 
comprises of 154 policy actions observations over the period October 2005 to October 2018. 
Driskoll and Kraay standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. Estimates of coefficients and t-
ratios are robust to residual heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.  
  Coefficient    
  Expected  Unexpected  R² 
Oil and Gas  - 3.612** - 1.204 0.26 
 (1.236) (1.24)  
Basic materials  - 0.396 0.421 0.04 
 (0.602) (0 .359 )  
Industrials  - 0.533  - 3.33** 0.097 
 (0.389) (0.65)  
Consumer Goods 0.249 - 2.20** 0.40 
 (0.511) (0.117)  
Health Care - 0.205 - 3.27** 0.34 
 (0.502) (1.180)  
Consumer Services - 0.091 - 0.05 0.04 
 (0.711) (1.62)  
Telecommunications  - 0.839 - 4.01**  0.48 
  (0.982) (1.712)  
Utilities  0.563 - 2.10**  0.36 
 (0.418) (0.55)  
Financials  0.076 - 2.94** 0.45 
 (0.55) (0.73)  
Technologies  0.042 - 1.038 0.13 
  (0.416) (1.10)   
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01      
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These discrepancies in industry responsiveness can largely be explained by the inherent 
differences in the systematic risk associated with investment projects within each industry 
(Gilbertson, 2008). As explained by Gilbertson (2008), industries with larger market betas assume 
a higher risk premium.  As such, the return volatility for these industries are exacerbated by 
unexpected repo rate changes. These differential return volatilities are therefore suggestive of 
certain industries being more vulnerable to unfavourable adjustments in official monetary policy.  
5.3. Economic Estimations underpinning stock market responses  
This paper has until this point measured and discussed the reaction of equity markets in South 
Africa to surprise monetary policy actions. An important contribution of this paper is to also 
establish the economic reasons that explain the observed reaction. In section 2, the paper 
mentioned three broad reasons why equity markets respond negatively to surprise policy 
tightening as highlighted by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). They are worth echoing again:   
a) The decline in stock prices may be attributed to a cut in expected future dividends 
b) Tightening may lead to an increase in the rate used to discount the dividends 
c) A rise in interest rates may lead to an increase the equity premium/excess return 
associated with investing in equities 
This paper employs a structured approach, very similar to Campbell and Ammer (1991: 1993) 
and improved by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Campbell and Ammer (1991: 1993) used log 
linear estimations to categorise equity premiums (excess returns) in order to ascertain which 
returns are attributable to news relating to real interest rates, dividends and future excess returns. 
The authors then employ a VAR methodology to attain proxies for the relevant expectations.  
This paper derives the surprise element of monetary policy from the use of one month JIBAR 
futures which serves as a robust proxy for news regarding the path of monetary in South Africa 
as with Bernanke & Kuttner (2005). The surprise policy action variable allows us to estimate the 
impact that surprise policy actions have on future expected dividends, interest rates and expected 
future excess returns which is an improvement to the Campbell and Ammer (1991: 1993) 
framework.  
The linearization model presented by Campbell and Ammer (1993) is presented below:  
                                          𝑢𝑡+1
𝑦 = 𝑒𝑡+1
∗𝑑 −  𝑒𝑡+1
∗𝑟 −  𝑒𝑡+1
∗𝑦
                                                      (9) 
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The variable of interest is the log excess return (expressed as 𝑦𝑡+1) on equities and can be 
defined as the total return of equities (gross of dividends), less the risk free rate.14 The returns 
over period t+1 can be estimated over period t which is essentially from the start of time t to the 
start of time t+1. The variable 𝑢𝑡+1
𝑦
 denotes the unexpected excess return at time t. The 
unexpected excess return is the difference between expectations at time t and t+1 (i.e. 𝑟𝑡+1 - 
𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+1). The “𝑒s” in equation 9 represent revised expectations between period t and t+1 and the 
asterisk (*) represents a discounted sum in order that:  
                                        𝑒𝑡+1
∗𝑑 = (𝐸𝑡+1 −  𝐸𝑡) ∑ 𝛿
𝑘∆𝑑𝑡+1+𝑘
∞
𝑘=0                                        (10) 
                                         𝑒𝑡+1
∗𝑟 = (𝐸𝑡+1 −  𝐸𝑡) ∑ 𝛿
𝑘𝑟𝑡+1+𝑘
∞
𝑘=0                                           (11)   
                                          𝑒𝑡+1
∗𝑦 = (𝐸𝑡+1 −  𝐸𝑡) ∑ 𝛿
𝑘𝑦𝑡+1+𝑘
∞
𝑘=0                                          (12) 
The factor 𝛿 represents a steady state ratio of the stock price to the stock price plus dividends and 
is predetermined at 0.9962 (Campbell, 1991; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Equation 9 is 
essentially a mathematical relation of current excess returns to revisions in expectations about 
dividends, interest rates and future excess returns. Furthermore, for simplicity, this paper 
implements a VAR to model the expectations denoted in equation 10 -12 using only excess 
returns, interest rates, and future excess returns and no other indicators15.  
An important consideration is that the VAR does not include dividends explicitly as a variable to 
be estimated (just the revised expectation thereof). While it possible in principle to forecast in the 
VAR, it proves difficult practically as dividends are highly seasonal and the process is non-
stationary (unit root close to 1) (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). As far as the VAR underestimates 
the explanatory power of excess returns, classifying dividends as a residual may result in the model 
ascribing “too much” of the return variability to dividends (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14This paper uses the 10 year SA Bond yield as a proxy for the risk free rate.  
15 To implement the categorization/ decomposition of excess returns, equations 10 -12 require empirical proxies for all the 
expectations denoted. Campbell (1991:1993) utilise the VAR approach using variables like excess returns and real interest rates, 
including other indicators that would be considered in forecasting. For example Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use the relative bill 
rate, dividend price ratio, and the yield spread between the 1 month and 10 year treasury bonds.  
26 
 
Table 8: Results from VAR decomposition 
This table shows the effect of unexpected monetary actions on the JSE’s All Share current excess returns, future 
excess returns, interest rates and dividends. For simplicity, this paper utilises a VAR with 4 variables to build interest 
rate and excess return forecasts and is estimated over the full sample of the years 2005 – 2018.  
  
Sub Sample: 154 observations used 
for VAR analysis  
  2005 – 2018 
Current Excess 
Returns   
-21.84 
(-2.0371)*      
Future Excess 
Returns 
  
 
5.94 
(2.9561)* 
      
Interest Rates 
  
11.38 
(2.5699)* 
      
Dividends 
  
-4.52 
(-2.8451)*     
       
Data Source: Bloomberg. Calculations by author. *Significant at 10% level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Table 8 reports results from the VAR estimation. The results show that in South Africa, contrary 
to the United States (see Jensen and Johnson, 1995; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005: Maio, 2013) 
and Germany (Fausch, 2018), all three economic reasons that could plausibly explain equity 
market reaction to policy changes are large and significant. Interestingly, news regarding the 
discount rate accounts for a sizeable and significant portion of current excess returns (total share 
over 50%). See section 2 for a theoretical explanation of the relationship between interest rates 
and the discount rate. This reinforces findings by Li and Hu (1998) who argue that the response 
is justified by the liquidity effect. When stock market participants perceive monetary policy to be 
tighter than expected, their response (through equity prices) is larger and stronger.  
This can be attributed to the different interest rate regimes and geographical nuances prevailing 
within each financial market (Fausch and Sigonius, 2017). The USA and Europe have 
implemented similar monetary policy interventions (example quantitative easing), while South 
Africa’s interest rates were never negative during the sample period and remained relatively 
higher.  Moreover, revisions of future excess returns and dividends account for just over 27% 
and 20% of the response of current excess returns respectively.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the relationship between stock market returns with monetary conditions 
in South Africa. Theoretically, it was identified that monetary policy actions impact stock prices 
through two channels of influence, namely (a) the discount rate and or (b) future expected cash 
flows. Based on the aforementioned theoretical considerations, it established that in South Africa, 
the equity market will respond strongly to unexpected monetary policy interventions using one 
month JIBAR futures as a proxy for policy expectations. The results show that a 1% surprise hike 
leads the JSE All Share index to decline by 2.71%. The result is significant and robust. 
Furthermore, it is shown that the reaction of different industries is heterogeneous. Some 
industries like technology, telecommunications and commodities display a higher sensitivity to 
changes in the policy rate. Finally, a VAR technique was utilised to decompose the response of 
stock returns. The results show that current excess returns in the equity market were attributable 
to revisions in future dividends, interest rates and future excess returns. This result differs 
somewhat to some literature, particularly that news on the discount rate has a sizeable and 
significant impact on excess returns. However, the difference in the results highlights an 
important consideration – stock market responses are strongly influenced by the prevailing 
interest rate regime. Interestingly, the SARB implemented more restrictive policy actions that 
expansionary ones during the sample period, explaining the strong reaction of equity markets to 
unexpected monetary policy.  
Such a relationship has crucial implications for both monetary policy authorities and market 
participants. For the former, understanding transmission channels for policy action is key and for 
the latter, the relationship is an important consideration for stock price valuations, portfolio 
formations and asset allocations. Although the aim of monetary policy is to somewhat influence 
real macroeconomic variables such as inflation, output and employment (Bernanke and Kuttner, 
2005), central bankers and stock market participants should be aware of the relationship outlined 
above so that the effects of policy shifts can be better understood (Ioannidis and Kontonikas, 
2008).  
Another important implication for the SARB is whether or not it should respond to stock price 
movements: one argument is that monetary policymakers should change the repo rate to reduce 
overall macroeconomic volatility caused by developing stock price bubbles. However, another 
approach is for monetary authorities to wait for a stock price reversal, and if it happens, to react 
tentatively if there are implications for inflation and output stability (Ioannidis and Kontonikas, 
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2008). The evidence of cyclical variation having an effect on the influence of monetary policy on 
stock prices and foreign exchange returns should also be taken into account by monetary 
authorities who may want to react with a lighter hand during recessions to try to ensure overall 
market stability (Basistha and Kurov, 2008). Taking into account the differential effect by industry 
in the South African context, the SARB may want to consider the effects of repo rate changes on 
industries fundamental to South Africa’s employment capability and general economic growth.  
Lastly, there is sufficient scope to improve on this study. Firstly, one can employ a longer time 
period to compare how the stock market behaved under different interest rate regimes in South 
Africa. Moreover, one can also simultaneously study the effects of monetary policy and other 
political and macroeconomic news on the stock market. This would improve the robustness of 
the VAR analysis which would contain more variables and thus further account for the 
endogeneity problem.  
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Appendix 
TABLE 9 
Monetary Policy Events 2005 - 2018  
Table 9 displays all changes the MPC and their corresponding dates, made during the sample. The text in red 
highlights restrictive stances while the green highlights expansionary stances. The table highlights that the MPC have 
been more restrictive over the sample period.  
Date  
Repo 
Rate  
Change in 
Policy Date  Repo Rate  
Change in 
Policy 
10/02/2005 7% No 20/01/2011 No 
14/04/2005 No  24/03/2011 No 
9/06/2005   No  21/07/2011 No 
11/08/2005 No  19/01/2012 No 
13/10/2005 No  24/05/2012 No 
8/12/2005   No  19/07/2012 5% Yes: 50bp 
2/2/2006   No  20/09/2012 No 
13/04/2006 No  22/11/2012 No 
8/06/2006 7,50% Yes:50bp 24/01/2013 No 
3/08/2006 8,00% Yes:50bp 18/07/2013 No 
12/10/2006 8,50% Yes:50bp 22/05/2013 No 
15/02/2007 No 22/05/2014 No 
12/04/2007 No 17/07/2014 5,75% Yes: 25bp 
16/08/2007 10,00% Yes: 50bp 20/11/2014 No 
11/10/2007 10,50% Yes: 50bp 20/07/2017 6,75% Yes:25bp 
10/04/2008 11,50% Yes: 50bp 20/09/2018 No 
12/06/2008 12% Yes: 50bp       
14/08/2008 No       
11/12/2008 11,50% Yes: 50bp       
22/09/2009 No       
13/05/2010 No       
22/07/2010 No       
09/09/2010 6% Yes: 50bp       
18/11/2010 5,5% Yes: 50bp       
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List of Figures  
Figure 1 
One month JIBAR compared to the SARB repo rate.  
The figure below shows the movement of the one month JIBAR relative to the SARB repo rate over the 
period 2005 – 2018.  
 
Figure 2: Unanticipated Repo Rate and All Share Index Returns using monthly data 
The figure below is a scatterplot of the monthly JSE All Share Index Returns compared to changes in the repo rate 
for the sample of 154 months.  
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Results from various Time Series Tests  
1. Auto Correlation Test (Excluding Industry Analysis)  
Auto Correlation     
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests    
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h   
Sample: 2005M10 2018M10     
Included observations: 154     
     
Lags LM-Stat    
1 7.575859 Prob   
2 15.25091 0.5774 First Lag sufficient 
Probs from chi-square with 9 df.  0.0843   
     
 
2. Auto Correlation Test (Including Industry) 
Auto Correlation  *  
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests   
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h  
Sample: 2005M10 2018M10    
Included observations: 154    
    
Lags LM-Stat   
1 18.88609 Prob  
2 27.58831 0.8025  
3 16.10723 0.3272  
Probs from chi-square with 25 df.  0.9116  
    
 
